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THE 20TH ANNUAL CHARLES W. FROESSEL
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MOOT COURT COMPETITION
FACT PATTERN
Heather A. Keane & Katherine T.L. Wren
A Note on the Format
The Froessel Competition Fact Pattern contains three fictitious
federal court opinions. Citations in the opinions follow formatting
specifications for Court Documents and Legal Memoranda in The
Bluebook, 16th ed.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF FROESSEL
--------------------------------------------. 
-- -- -- . . . .. X
WILLAMINA WALLACE and
MURRON McGREGOR,
Plaintiffs,
v. 1996 CIV 3897 (HGS)
MEMORANDUM
THE STATE OF FROESSEL,
Defendant.
-------------------------------------------- x
Hamilton G. Stirling, United States District Judge:
I. Procedural Summary
Plaintiffs seek an injunction to compel the State of Froessel to
grant them a marriage license. Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality
of the Froessel Marriage Statute ("FMS") § 186.5 pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 on the ground that the statute violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,' by discriminating based on sex.
Plaintiffs also challenge Froessel's statutes prohibiting assisted
suicide.2 Dr. Wallace is suing for the right to assist her patient in
committing suicide. Ms. McGregor is suing for the right to assisted
suicide. Accordingly,the plaintiffs argue that these statutes violate the
'The Fourteenth Amendment to U.S. Constitutionprovides, "No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
2 Both sides concede physicians have standing to assert the rights of their
terminally ill patients. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 795 (9th Cir.
1996). Thus, Dr. Wallace has standing to bring this suit.
720 [Vol. XIII
FROESSEL FACT PA TTERN
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Plaintiffs bring this
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and ask that the court grant declaratory
and injunctive relief to protect their federally guaranteed rights deprived
by Froessel.
Il. Undisputed Facts
A. Same-Sex Marriage
Due to its reputation as a liberal state, Froessel has attracted a
large population of minorities. Isabella Yorks, Minority Population
Soars Again In Froessel, The Froessel Times, Oct. 8, 1995, at BI.
Indeed, it was Froessel's friendly atmosphere toward minorities that led
Willamina Wallace, a homosexual female, to take up her medical
residency training at St. Laughlin Memorial Hospital in Froessel in
1977. Dr. Wallace graduated from Hamish Medical School summa cum
laude in 1977.
At the 1979 Gay and Lesbian Pride Parade ("Parade"), 4 Dr.
Wallace met Murron McGregor. At that time, Ms. McGregor was an
architecture student at the University of Froessel ("UF"). They became
close friends when they learned that they shared a passion for Picasso's
work. Their friendship bloomed into romance. Then, when Ms.
McGregor graduated from UF in 1981, Dr. Wallace and Ms. McGregor
decided to live together.
In 1983, Dr. Wallace completed her residency program and
' The Fourteenth Amendment to U.S. Constitution provides, "No State shall..
• deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV.
4 The Parade was instituted in 1977 by a group of homosexuals who wanted to
show their pride in their identity. When this group applied for a license for the Parade, the
Froessel City Department of Activities granted this license. The only requirement the
Department imposed was that the Parade be non-violent.
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earned the honor "Resident of the Year." Also that year, the Board of
Directors of St. Laughlin Memorial Hospital, recognizing Dr. Wallace's
talent and dedication to the medical profession, offered her a permanent
position. Dr. Wallace and Ms. McGregor were happy about this because
it meant that they did not have to relocate to a different state.' They had
experienced no prejudice in their respective workplaces or in their
community.
By 1991, Dr. Wallace had become a top pediatrician at St.
Laughlin. Additionally, Ms. McGregor was hired by the Housing
Department of the State of Froessel, which gave exceptional benefits to
its employees. In 1993, Dr. Wallace and Ms. McGregor realized that
they wanted their union to become a legally recognized marriage. Upon
their relationship becoming legally recognized, Dr. Wallace and Ms.
McGregor could also enjoy the benefits of marriage, including naming
each other as the beneficiaries of each other's estate and insurance
policies.
As an employee of the State of Froessel, Ms. McGregor has a
benefits package, including a life insurance policy. The State of
Froessel's insurance policy contains the following language:6
1. "Beneficiary" is defined as a legally recognized
spouse or child.
23. Benefits will be paid to a beneficiary if the
insured committed suicide; however, no benefits
will be paid to a beneficiary who was involved
in the suicide if a valid state law prohibits
Six other hospitals offered Dr. Wallace a position. None of them are located in
Froessel. Dr. Wallace and Ms. McGregordecided that if Dr. Wallace were to relocate from
Froessel, Ms. McGregor would accompany her.
'6 The constitutionality of these provisions are not being challenged, nor will this
Court decide them. The insurance policy, although the impetus for this lawsuit, is not itself
challenged. The constitutionality of Froessel's statutes are the subject of this lawsuit.
FROESSEL FACT PATTERN
assisted suicide at the time of the
suicide.
Thus, the only way Dr. Wallace can be the beneficiary of Ms.
McGregor's insurance policy is if they are legally married.7 Ms.
McGregor has no other beneficiary.'
Dr. Wallace and Ms. McGregor filed for a marriage license at
the State of Froessel Department of Health. Froessel denied their
request for a marriage license because they are of the same gender. The
clerk handed them a copy of FMS § 186.5, which provides in pertinent
part:
A marriage is valid only if it is solemnized and
registered, between an unmarried male and an unmarried
female, who are at least 18 years of age and not
otherwise disqualified.
The clerk then said, "Sorry. As you can see, I can give marriage licenses
only to heterosexual couples." In a desperate attempt to obtain a license,
Dr. Wallace told the clerk that they were not "a homosexual couple, but
a same-sex couple." In addition, when Dr. Wallace and Ms. McGregor
sued, they did not allege in their complaint that they are homosexuals.
Rather, they alleged that they are a same-sex couple. Still, the clerk
denied Dr. Wallace and Ms. McGregor a marriage license, and they left
the Department of Health distraught.
Dr. Wallace's insurance policy provides similar requirements for beneficiaries.
Ms. McGregor was orphaned at fifteen. Likewise, Dr. Wallace has been
estranged from her family since she "came out."
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B. Hastening Death
On October 5, 1994, after feeling ill at the 1994 Parade
festivities Ms. McGregor went for a physical at the office of her
longtime general practitioner, Dr. Edward Longshanks. After several
tests, Dr. Longshanks informed Ms. McGregor that she had
metastasizing lymphoma, a rare and fatal form of cancer.9 Although she
had been feeling "rundown" recently, Ms. McGregor assumed that her
condition resulted from her busy schedule and that it was nothing more
than fatigue or, possibly a cold. After receiving this news she returned
home and informed Dr. Wallace of her condition. °
This news stunned and dismayed Dr. Wallace, and she joined
Ms. McGregor at her next appointment with Dr. Longshankson October
19, 1994. The information Dr. Longshanks provided went as follows:
Dr. Longshanks: I am an oncologist, and therefore, I
have spent many years researching all types of cancer.
However, I have specialized in the study of lymphomas.
As I said in our first visit, this cancer is not very
common, but is unfortunately fatal. Metastasizing
lymphoma is a rapid killer. As my records reflect, you
have already begun to experience dizziness and
headaches which is a result of the tumor pressing
against the base of your brain stem. As the tumor
continues to grow, you will also experience blackouts,
motor and speech problems, and debilitating headaches.
As your cancer metastasizes, tumors will grow on your
lymph nodes, and cause pain and swelling in the organ
to which the cancer attaches. Unfortunately, no
This Court will not recognize any additional facts about cancer outside of those
included in this opinion.
0 Dr. Wallace specializes in pediatric oncology at St. Laughlin Memorial
Hospital.
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treatment will slow the progression of the disease as it
has already progressed into your blood stream. I
promise to do all I can to ease your pain.
After meeting with Dr. Longshanks, Dr. Wallace contacted Dr.
Robert Bruce, a leading cancer specialist who has conducted extensive
research on lymphomas. Dr. Bruce examined Ms. McGregor and
confirmed Dr. Longshanks's prognosis. However, Dr. Bruce explained
to Dr. Wallace and Ms. McGregor that he was doing research at Smythe
Research Center on lymphomas and that a treatment is near."
In November 1995, Ms. McGregor began feeling the symptoms
associated with the final phase of the disease. Ms. McGregor informed
Dr. Wallace of her wish to hasten her death and end her suffering. Ms.
McGregor also asked Dr. Wallace to help her carry out her death.
Initially, Dr. Wallace was hesitant because the thought of losing Ms.
McGregor was too much to endure. However, Dr. Wallace finally
agreed to assist Ms. McGregor in hastening her death after Ms.
McGregor made it clear that she planned to end her life with or without
physician assistance. In addition, Ms. McGregor informed several
friends, Dr. Longshanks, and her beloved Uncle Argyle that she wanted
to end her suffering.
Ms. McGregor's request did not come as a surprise to Dr.
Wallace, her close friends, or her uncle. Prior to being diagnosed with
cancer, Ms. McGregor wrote a living will. In her living will she
expressed her desire to be removed from life support if she were unable
to communicate and were being kept alive by artificial means. 2
Ms. McGregor and Dr. Wallace were aware that Froessel had
According to Dr. Bruce, it would take at least one and a half years to perfect a
cure and put it on the market.
2 Froessel Health & Medicine Law ("FHM") § 80.383 permits competent adults,
by a living will and power of attorney, to elect in advance to reject life-sustaining medical
treatment. More than forty other states have also adopted living will statutes.
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statutes that prohibit assisting suicide. 3 The Froessel statutes read as
follows:
Section 167.20: A person is guilty of manslaughter in
the second degree when that person intentionally aids
another person in committing suicide. Violating this
provision is a class C felony.
Section 514.71: A person is guilty of promoting a
suicide attempt if that person intentionally aids a person
to attempt suicide. Violating this provision is a class E
felony.
Ms. McGregor expressed her wish to hasten her death in a
written declaration. Her attorney and two paralegals witnessed the
declaration. Ms. McGregor stated:
I am thirty-seven years old and have always prided
myself on being a hardworking and successful person.
I loved my job as an architect for the State of Froessel,
and it saddened me deeply when I had to leave it as a
result of having cancer. 4 Before becoming sick I was
very athletic and independent. Now, unfortunately, I am
completely dependent on others, primarily on my
beloved Willamina Wallace. My disease has progressed
into the final stage, and I am constantly in pain. I have
tumors ravaging my body, which have caused extreme
motor problems, making the simplest task difficult.
Although I have been prescribed painkillers, they are
13 Thirty-two additional states make assisted suicide a criminal offense.
Ms. McGregor's life insurancepolicy through the State of Froessel is still valid,
even though she is no longer working for the State of Froessel.
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basically useless. I live every moment of every day in
pain, and I do not want to live like this any longer. I do
not believe I will ever get better or that a cure will be
found before my death. Therefore, I want my longtime
partner and doctor, Willamina Wallace to assist me in
hastening my death. We have agreed on the
arrangements, and I am very comfortable with them.
Willamina Wallace will write a prescription for
Thonicane. I will then obtain the drug and take a lethal
dosage of it. I have chosen this method because it is
quick and painless. These are my wishes.
Dr. Wallace and Ms. McGregor sued challenging the
constitutionality of Froessel's prohibition of same-sex marriages and the
statutes prohibiting assisting suicide.
III. Discussion: Same-Sex Marriage
This Court finds that FMS § 186.5 is unconstitutionalas applied
because it discriminates based on sex and does not satisfy the
intermediate scrutiny standard of review. Federal and state courts have
concluded that the standard of review for equal protection issues for
homosexuals is the rational basis standard. See, e.g., Shahar v. Bowers,
70 F.3d 1218,1225 (11 th Cir. 1995); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W. 2d 185,
187 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). However, for
statutes that discriminate based on sex, an intermediate level of scrutiny
is the proper standard of review. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976). Here, the proper standard is the intermediate level because FMS
§ 186.5, as applied, discriminates based on sex. To be constitutional, a
state statute must (1) serve important governmental objectives and (2)
be substantially related to achieving those objectives. See id. Froessel
fails to satisfy this test. Therefore, this Court finds that FMS § 186.5 is
unconstitutional as applied.
19971 727
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A. FMS § 186.5 Discriminates Based On Sex
1. Definition of the Term "Sex"
Sex discriminationoccurs when a person is discriminatedagainst
based on that person's sex. Generally, sex discrimination has been
equated with gender discrimination, but sex discrimination could also
mean "a prohibition . . . based on human psychological and
physiological characteristics or on sexual orientation." Hopkins v.
Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 749 (4th Cir. 1996). Same-sex
sexual harassment may be actionable. See. e.g., McWilliams v. Fairfax
County Bd. of Super., 72 F.3d 1191, 1195 n.4 (4th Cir. 1996) (reserving
decision on same-sex sexual harassment due to division among federal
courts); Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir.
1995) (stating that sexual harassment of "men by other men, or women
by other women," may be actionable).
The parties agree that FMS § 186.5 prevents only same-sex
couples from marrying. By its plain language, FMS § 186.5 restricts
marital relations to a man and a woman. Also, the requisites of FMS §
186.39 mandate that a marriage be an institution between only a man
and a woman. 5 If Dr. Wallace were a man, Froessel would allow her to
'" FMS § 186.39, Requisites of Valid Marriage, provides that:
To make a marriage valid in this State, it shall be necessary that:
(1) the parties to the marriage are not related to each
other by any degree, brother and sister by whole or
half-blood, uncle and niece, aunt and nephew;
(2) at the time of contracting the marriage, each of the
parties is at least eighteen (1 8) years old;
(3) at the time of contracting the marriage, the man
does not have any lawful wife living, and the
woman does not have any lawful husband living;
(4) the man and woman to be married obtained a
license for the purpose from the Department of
Health, State of Froessel;
(5) the marriage ceremony be performed in this State
FR OESSEL FACT PATTERN
marry Ms. McGregor. Therefore, because these requisites restrict same-
sex couples from legally uniting, sex discriminationexists. FMS § 186.5
"denies same-sex couples access to marital status and its concomitant
rights and benefits." Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 60 (Haw. 1993).
Such "concomitantrights and benefits" include the ability to file a joint
tax return, to receive benefits and inheritance, to obtain spousal support,
and to provide insurance coverage for a spouse. Thus, FMS § 186.5
"establishes a sex-based classification" that the Equal Protection Clause
prohibits. See id. at 64.
2. Equal Protection
When a statute imposes such a disability that "materially
impair[s] the ability of single persons to obtain contraceptives," it is
unconstitutional. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446 (1972).
The Supreme Court likewise found unconstitutional a statute that
"'materially impair[ed] the ability of males ... to purchase . . . beer
•..," Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 196 (1976) (quoting Eisenstadt,
405 U.S. at 446)). Following the Supreme Court's logic, this Court
cannot find constitutionala statute that "materially impair[s] the ability
of' same-sex couples to marry.
This Court agrees with the Plaintiffs' contention that a state may
not deny any two people the right to marry. Marriage is "essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free" people. Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 12 (1967). In Loving, the Supreme Court struck down a Virginia
anti-miscegenation statute that prohibited marriage between people of
different races. See id. at 8. The Court took this progressive stand and
recognized that a state may not deny anyone the opportunity to marry a
by an entity with a valid license to solemnize
marriages, in the presence of the man and woman
to be married, with at least one third party present
to witness the marriage.
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person of another race.
Similarly, this Court finds that FMS § 186.5, which prevents
same-sex marriages, discriminates based on sex. Because sex is an
immutable characteristic, like race or national origin, "the imposition of
special disabilities upon the members of a particular sex because of their
sex would seem to violate 'the basic concept of our system that legal
burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility."'
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (quoting Weber v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 496 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)). Froessel
statutes that pertain to marriage permit marriages only between
opposite-sex couples. Thus, when Froessel denies same-sex couples the
opportunity to marry, it also denies same-sex couples the benefits that
married opposite-sexcouples receive. This violates homosexuals' civil
rights. See Romer v. Evans, 16 S. Ct. 1620, 1626 (1996).
In Romer, the Supreme Court struck down a Colorado
amendment that repealed "existing'statutes, regulations, ordinances, and
policies of state and local entities that barred discrimination based on
sexual orientation." 116 S. Ct. at 1624 (citing Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d
1270, 1279 (Colo. 1993)). The Court explained that a person may not
be denied benefits based on sexual orientation. Additionally, some
jurisdictions accord same-sex couples certain benefits. 6 Here, because
a same-sex couple is prohibited from marrying, FMS § 186.5 denies
same-sex couples the same benefits available to married opposite-sex
couples.
FMS § 186.5 violates the Equal Protection Clause, see U.S.
Const. amend. XIV, because it provides "dissimilar treatment for men
and women who are thus similarly situated." Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71,
77 (1971); Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684. Here, Dr. Wallace and Ms.
6 Canada's human rights tribunal ruled that the federal government must extend
benefits to same-sex partners of government employees. Times Wire Report, World In
Brief. L.A. Times, June 14, 1996, at A4. Also, David Dinkins, former New York City
mayor, signed an order permitting same-sex couples to register as unmarried "domestic
partners." Johnathan P. Hicks, A Legal Threshold is Crossed by Gay Couples in New York,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1993, at Al.
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McGregor are intelligent, working women who have been living in a
monogamous relationship for fifteen years. They are similarly situated
to married citizens of Froessel. However, because they are both female,
they cannot legalize their union through matrimony.
Although other courts have addressed the issue of whether same-
sex marriages constitute a fundamental right, that issue is not before US.1
7
However, Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. 1974), deserves more
examination. The appellants in Sne contended that denying the
opportunity of a man "to marry another man is to construct an
unconstitutional classification 'on account of sex."' Id. at 1190. The
respondent-state argued that its laws do not discriminate based on sex
"so long as marriage licenses are denied equally to both male and female
pairs." Id. at 1191. The court agreed with the respondent and relied on
the belief that "marriage" is a union between a man and a woman only.
Thus, the court dismissed the appellants' equal protection claim because
the "plain reading of [Washington's] marriage statutes [indicated] that
the legislature has not authorized same-sex marriages." Id. at 1189. We
disagree with the Sing court. In Loving, the Supreme Court expressly
rejected the "notion that the mere 'equal application' of a statute
containing racial classifications" prevents the Equal Protection Clause
from being violated. 388 U.S. at 10. The Singer court addressed this
issue but did not analogize mixed-race and same-sex marriages. See 522
P.2d at 1191. Again, we disagree with the Singer court. The 'equal
application' of FMS § 186.5 to homosexual men and to homosexual
women constitutes a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
It is true that marriage is generally understood as a union
between a man and a woman. However, "constitutional law may
mandate, like it or not, that customs change with an evolving social
'" See DeSantov. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. 1984) (holding that Pennsylvania
does not recognize common law, same-sex marriage); Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036,
1039 n.2 (9th Cir. 1982) (leaving question of whether Colorado permits same-sex marriage
for anothercase); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973) (stating no
constitutional protection of same-sex marriage); Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 186 (holding that
same-sex marriage is not a fundamental right).
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order." Baehr, 852 P.2d at 63. Our social order has changed. Not only
are homosexuals accepted in our society today, they are also given
certain rights and benefits that were previously denied to them. We
believe that another right that must be recognized for homosexuals is the
right to marry. Because FMS § 186.5 prohibits same-sex couples from
marrying, this Court finds that the statute discriminates based on sex in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
B. FMS § 186.5 Does Not Satisfy the
Intermediate Scrutiny Test
The proper standard of review for statutes that discriminate
based on sex is intermediate scrutiny. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
197. We have already found that FMS § 186.5 discriminates based on
sex. Thus, for FMS § 186.5 to be constitutional,Froessel must show that
it (1) serves important governmental objectives and (2) is substantially
related to achieving those objectives. Id. Froessel sets forth two
objectives: (a) preventing the spread of sexually-transmitted diseases
("STDs") and (b) promoting procreation. Although Froessel's purported
objectives are valid, this Court finds that Froessel's classification is not
substantially related to achieving those objectives. Accordingly, this
Court finds that Froessel does not satisfy the intermediate scrutiny test.
1. Important Government Objectives
a. Preventing STDs
Froessel claims that one of its objectives in restricting marriage
to opposite-sex couples is to prevent the spread of STDs. This concerns
"the protection of public health and safety, [which] represents an
important function of state and local governments." See Craig, 429 U.S.
at 199-200 (finding that enhancing traffic safety by restricting sale of
FROESSEL FACT PA TTERN
alcohol is a valid objective because it pertains to public health and
safety). The total percentage of those affected with STDs in Froessel is
three percent. Linn von Dee, Froessel Health Watch, June 18, 1995, at
14. Although this percentage seems low, it is enough to rouse Froessel's
concern to "enhance" the health of its citizens.
Froessel also presents statistics from 1994 showing that sixty-
one percent of its homosexual population is affected with STDs. Id. at
17. In contrast, the national report from 1994 shows that the national
percentage of homosexuals affected with STDs was fifty-three percent.
Charley Reese, Calm Down and Listen to Helms - The Senator Speaks
the Truth, Orlando Sentinel, July 18, 1995, at A6. Because the average
number of homosexuals in Froessel affected by STDs is higher than the
national average, Froessel indubitably has a valid interest in reducing
and preventing the further spread of STDs, especially among
homosexuals.
b. Promoting Procreation
Froessel argues that procreation is another objective of FMS §
186.5. Promoting procreation is a valid objective because "procreation
[is] fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race." Skinner
v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). Because procreation is possible
only between a man and a woman, FMS § 186.5 arguably promotes this
objective.
2. Substantial Relation
To find constitutional a statute that prevents people from
receiving certain rights, a court must find that the statute is substantially
related to achieving the state's objective. Even though a state can show
an important objective through its classification, a statute can still be
held unconstitutional if the classification is not substantially related to
19971 733
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
the objective. Craig, 429 U.S. at 199-200; Reed, 404 U.S. at 76.
a. Preventing STDs
FMS § 186.5 does not satisfy the "substantial relationship"
prong of intermediate scrutiny. The statistics Froessel presents do not
support Froessel's contention that its sex-based classification "closely
serves to achieve that objective and therefore the distinction cannot
under Reed withstand equal protection challenge." Crig, 429 U.S. at
199-200. A statute such as FMS § 186.5 is unconstitutional as applied
if it "seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class that it
affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests."
Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627. Despite Froessel's argument that its
objective is to prevent the spread of STDs, this Court concludes that
FMS § 186.5's objective is hostile to and shows "animus" toward
homosexuals by depriving them of their right to marry. Although
Froessel's purported objective is valid, preventing same-sex couples
from marrying is not substantially related to achieving this objective.
Furthermore, Froessel has not shown how preventing same-sex
couples from marrying will reduce the risk of spreading STDs. When
Froessel passed FMS § 186.5, it did not consider that even though
homosexuals are not married, they can, and do, share sexual relations.
Marriage has no bearing on whether a couple, same-sex or opposite-sex,
will have sex and, if so, whether monogamously or otherwise. STDs are
transmitted through sexual contact, not marriage. What Froessel appears
to be doing is stereotyping homosexuals by automatically attaching
STDs to homosexuality, and, as the Supreme Court recently found,
stereotyping is impermissible. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct.
2264 (1996) (finding that all-male military schools cannot stereotype
women as a "weaker sex" and deny them admission). Froessel also
failed to consider that marriage promotes stability and long-term
commitment. Thus, this Court fails to see the correlation between
same-sex marriage and STDs. Sixty-one percent of homosexuals in
734 [Vol. XIII
FROESSEL FACT PA TTERN
Froessel have some form of STD. Presumably, none of these
homosexuals are in a same-sex marriage. If none of the reported
homosexuals with an STD are married, preventing same-sex marriage
will not reduce the number of people with STDs. Froessel should find
options that will actually prevent the spread of STDs without hindering
its citizens' rights. Froessel could vigorously educate its citizens about
safe sex, distribute free condoms, and increase funding to health-crisis
centers.
b. Promoting Procreation
Froessel also fails to show that prohibiting same-sex marriages
achieves its "procreation" objective. Offspring are not always the result
of marriage. For instance, senior citizens, who are incapable of having
children, may marry each other. Moreover, children are born out of
wedlock everyday. Therefore, permitting only opposite-sex marriages
does not achieve Froessel's "procreation" objective. Because classifying
homosexuals is not substantially related to Froessel's objective of
promoting procreation, this Court cannot find FMS § 186.5
constitutional under equal protection analysis.
IV. Discussion: Hastening Death
The State of Froessel's statutes prohibiting assisted suicide
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A statute
that prohibits aiding another person in committing suicide violates the
due process rights of terminally ill patients who wish to hasten their own
death with medication prescribed by their physician. See Compassion
in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 798 (9th Cir. 1996). The
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause demands that, "No state
shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law." U.S. Const. Amend. XIV. To initiate a due process claim or
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cause of action, the challenging party must have a liberty interest that is
curtailed by the challenged statute. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S.
11, 38 (1905). To determine whether the statute violates due process,
the challenger's liberty interest must be determined by balancing the
liberty interest against the relevant state interests. Youngberg v. Romeo,
457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982); Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299 (1982).
The liberty interest involved here is one's freedom to determine the time
and manner of one's death. After balancing that interest against the
State's interests, this Court holds that the Froessel statutes prohibiting a
person from assisting to hasten the death of another violates the Due
Process Clause.
A. Liberty Interest
A liberty interest exists in choosing the time and manner of one's
own death. To determine whether a liberty interest exists, courts look
either to history and tradition or to the implicit nature of the right. See
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (stating that
the Constitution protects sanctity of family because the institution of
family is deeply rooted in this nation's history and tradition); Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (holding that fundamental
liberties are those implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that
justice would be impossible without them). The proper analysis in
determining a liberty interest is whether the asserted interest is implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty, rather than whether it is deeply rooted
in our history or explicit in the Constitution. Accordingly, because the
right to decide the time and manner of one's own death is such a
personal and intimate decision, we hold that this right is implicit in the
concept of liberty.
It would be a misguided and stagnate stance if the only liberties
that this Court would recognize were those expressly provided for in the
Constitution or rooted in history. As the Supreme Court stated, "to
believe that the judicial exercise of judgment could be avoided by
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freezing due process of law at some fixed stage of time or thought is to
suggest that the most important aspect of constitutional adjudication is
a function for inanimate machines and not for judges." Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992) (quoting Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1952)).
The rigid historical definition of a liberty interest was used in the
often-criticized5-4 opinion of Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-
92 (1989) (upholding a state statute criminalizing sodomy because the
Constitution does not confer upon homosexuals the fundamental right
to engage in sodomy). The Bowers approach is not the proper analysis
under which liberty interests should be analyzed. Bowers dealt with the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
people, namely the right to be left alone. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Similarly, the right to hasten one's death
involves the right to be left alone and to make personal decisions
without state interference. The Supreme Court has repeatedly identified
liberty interests without strictly adhering to a historical analysis or an
explicit constitutional base. In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held
that women have a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause to
terminate their pregnancies. Roe, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973).
Similarly, in Loving v. Virginia, the Supreme Court held that under the
Due Process Clause the freedom to marry is a fundamental right.
Loving, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). The Court has also held that a
fundamental right of marital privacy is created by several expressly
mentioned fundamental guarantees not explicitly stated in the
Constitution. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965)
(holding Connecticut law prohibiting contraceptive use
unconstitutionally intrusive into marital privacy).
A liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment includes controlling the time and manner of
one's own death. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 813. The law affords
constitutional protection to control the most intimate personal decisions.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 850 (citing Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S.
678, 685 (1977)). The decision to end one's life, especially when the
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reason for doing so is to avoid excessive and protracted pain when faced
with certain death, is a personal and intimate one and is therefore
constitutionally protected. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 813.
The notion that competent people have a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment was
enunciated in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S.
261, 278 (1990). This decision was recently broadened by the Ninth
Circuit which held that competent adults who are terminally ill have a
constitutionally protected liberty interest to receive assistance in
hastening their deaths with the aid of medication prescribed by doctors.
See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 798. Similarly, Ms. McGregor is
a competent adult who suffers from a fatal disease and who desires the
assistance of a physician to end her suffering.
This. Court is confident that Ms. McGregor is a competent
woman who is able to make intimate and personal decisions without
interference from the state. Both Ms. McGregor's longtime, physician
and an expert on lymphomas diagnosed Ms. McGregor with cancer. Her
condition is fatal, and Ms. McGregor is experiencing the effects of her
cancer's final phase. at this time. Ms. McGregor is in continuous pain,
and available medical treatment has been exhausted. The situation
presented here is virtually identical to the one presented in the Ninth
Circuit, and therefore, we similarly find that Froessel's statutes are
unconstitutional because they violate the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Froessel notes that the Second Circuit, in a case identical to the
Ninth Circuit's case, rejected a due process challenge, finding no liberty
interest in determiningthe manner and method of one's own death. See
Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 724 (2d Cir. 1996). However, we find the
Second Circuit's reasoning unpersuasive because it used a strict
historical analysis to determine liberty interests. The court's decision in
Quill to accept an equal protection violation instead of a due process
violation lacks merit.
Froessel also seeks to distinguish this case from Compassion in
DyJg on the ground that, in that case, the doctors involved were the
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patient's personal physicians, whereas in this case, Dr. Wallace is Ms.
McGregor's longtime partner. Dr. Wallace was not Ms. McGregor's
regular physician, but she regularly treats cancer patients and has
become well acquainted with this particular form of cancer. Moreover,
Dr. Wallace is intimately involved in Ms. McGregor's treatment. We
find the requirement of physician assistance satisfied in this instance.
B. Balancing Test
After balancing the liberty interest against the State's asserted
interests, this Court finds that the State's attempt to curtail Plaintiffs'
liberty interest in hastening death is a violation of the Due Process
Clause. Whether one's constitutional rights have been violated must be
determined by balancing the liberty interest against the state interest.18
See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320; Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279;
Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 816. Froessel has asserted the
following three state interests to support its statutes prohibiting assisted
suicides: (1) preserving life; (2) preventing suicide; and (3) avoiding
influence of third parties. These three interests, while substantial, do not
outweigh the liberty interest in deciding the time and manner of one's
own death and the right to control one's own body. Therefore, the
liberty interest in hastening one's death outweighs the State's asserted
interests.
In Reno v. Flores, the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantee of due process includes a substantive component that forbids the government
from infringing on certain fundamental liberties, unless the infringement is narrowly
tailoredto servea compelling governmental interest, thereby surviving strict scrutiny. See
507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993). However, Flores did not take into account the line of cases
that used a balancing test, such as Youngberg, Mills, or Cruzan. The proper standard of
review in this case is a balancing test, not strict scrutiny. Moreover, because Froessel
cannot meet a balancing test, the assisted suicide statutes could not survive strict scrutiny,
the most stringent standard of review.
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1. Preserving Life
Froessel asserts preserving life as its first interest. The State has
an unqualified interest in preserving human life. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at
282; Compassion In Dying, 79 F.3d at 817. However, this interest is not
absolute; its strength depends on the circumstances presented. See
Compassion In Dying, 79 F.3d at 817. Froessel's interest in preserving
life does not outweigh an individual's liberty interest in assisted suicide
when the individual has a terminal illness.
Froessel has recognized that its interest in preserving life is not
absolute and does yield in certain instances. FHM § 80.383 provides
that a competent person has the right to elect in advance to reject
artificial life support. Additionally, forty other states have adopted
living will statutes. Therefore, since Froessel has made exceptionsto the
interest of preserving life before, it may not assert it as absolute now.
Moreover, a competent person has the constitutional right to
refuse medical treatment. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278 (citing Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-30 (1905)). Cruzan recognized that a
state has an interest in preserving human life. 497 U.S. at 282. Cruzan
further acknowledged a person's liberty interest under the Due Process
Clause to refuse unwanted medical treatment. Id. at 278. The Supreme
Court found that the state permissibly sought to advance those interests
through a heightened evidentiary standard. See id. at 281 (upholding a
Missouri statute requiring clear and convincing evidence of incompetent
person's wishes to withdraw life support). In contrast, the Froessel
statute never allows for assisted suicide.
Although the State has an interest in preserving life, that interest
does not outweigh a person's right to hasten his or her death. We hold
that a state may not force its citizens to live an exceedingly painful life
when they have made the difficult and personal choice to hasten their
death.
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2. Preventing Suicide
The next interest Froessel asserts is its interest in preventing
suicide. This interest is an outgrowth of the overall interest in
preserving life. While Froessel does have an interest in preventing
suicide, that interest does not outweigh the interest of a terminally ill
person in hastening that person's death.
Today, no state, including Froessel, prohibits committing suicide
or attempting to commit suicide. Defendant argues that, like Froessel,
most states have provisions for the involuntary commitment of people
to hospitals who attempt suicide. Such provisions, however, cannot be
equated with codifying suicide as unlawful.
Additionally, hastening death may not be considered suicide.
There is no discernable difference between a doctor who terminates life
support of a terminally ill patient and a doctor who provides a terminally
ill patient the means to hasten the patient's own death. Froessel's interest
in preventing suicide is not substantially stronger here than in cases that
involve other forms of death-hastening medical intervention. See
Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 824.
3. Avoiding Influence of Third Parties
.The final interest Froessel asserts in preventing the assistance of
suicide is avoiding the influence of third parties. A state may properly
assert an interest in prohibitingeven altruistic assistance to a person who
contemplates suicide. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 824. This
interest is based on the ground that allowing others to help an individual
to commit suicide may increase the incidence of suicide, undercut
society's commitment to the sanctity of life, and adversely affect the
person who provides the assistance. Compassion In Dying, 79 F.3d at
825.
The concern of third party involvement includes the concern that
terminally ill people will desire to hasten their death based on a sense of
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guilt or concern for their loved ones. The possibility that people will
want to hasten their deaths for the financial or emotional welfare of their
loved ones is valid. However, careful state regulation can minimize the
risk of abuse. Froessel has not chosen to regulate assisted suicide, but
it has forbidden it entirely, and that is not constitutionally permissible.
Froessel argues that it is dramatically different for people to end
their lives by their own hands than it is to receive assistance from a third
party. However, doctors have extensive training and are in a highly
regulated profession, thereby making it less likely that the doctors could
arbitrarily assist in suicides. The professional judgment of Dr. Wallace
in this case is not arbitrary. Moreover, when a person wants to hasten
his or her death, that person will find the means to do so with or without
a physician's help. Competent adults should have the benefit of a safe
and painless end to their lives.
Accordingly, this Court grants Plaintiffs' motion for declaratory
and injunctive relief, and Defendant is ordered to grant a marriage
license to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' motion for declaratory and injunctive
relief on the issue of hastening death is also granted.
SO ORDERED.
/s/
Hamilton J. Stirling, U.S.D.J.
Dated: July 8, 1996
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRTEENTH CIRCUIT
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THE STATE OF FROESSEL,
Defendant-Appellant,
Docket no. 96-9244
v. MEMORANDUM
WILLAMINA WALLACE and
MURRON McGREGOR,
Plaintiffs-Appellees.
-------------------------- x
JUDGES: Falkirk, D., Edinburgh, K., McAndrews, L.
Edinburgh, K., Circuit Judge:
I. Procedural Summary
Plaintiffs-Appellees,Dr. Willamina Wallace ("Dr. Wallace") and
Ms. Murron McGregor ("Ms. McGregor"), (collectively, "Appellees"),
a same-sex couple, sued the State of Froessel ("Froessel") in the District
Court for the District of Froessel. In that suit, Appellees sought
declaratory and injunctive relief to compel Froessel to grant a marriage
license to them, and for the right of Dr. Wallace to assist in the suicide
of Ms. McGregor. Appellees set forth two causes of action. First,
Appellees claim that Froessel violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, by discriminating
based on sex. Second, Appellees claim that Froessel violated their
Fourteenth Amendment right to Due Process, U.S. Const. amend XIV,
by infringing on a liberty interest.
The district court granted declarative and injunctive relief in
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
favor of the Plaintiffs on both issues. The district court applied
intermediate scrutiny and found that Froessel Marriage Statute ("FMS")
§ 186.5 violates the Equal Protection Clause, by discriminatingbased on
sex. See Wallace v. Froessel, 912 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D. Froe. 1996).
Reviewing the State of Froessel's assisted suicide statutes, the district
court found that the challenged statutes violated the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 11. Appellant timely appealed to
this Court.
II. Issues on Appeal
This Court finds that the district court erred by granting
declaratory and injunctive relief to Appellees. We find that (1) FMS §
186.5 does not discriminate based on sex and (2) the state of Froessel's
statutes prohibiting physician-assisted suicide do not violate the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. FMS § 186.5 does not
discriminate based on sex and, therefore, comports with the Equal
Protection Clause. Furthermore, there is no liberty interest in assisted
suicide protected by the Due Process Clause, and therefore, prohibiting
assisted suicide does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. We
therefore reverse the district court's decision on both causes of action.
III Discussion: Same-Sex Marriage
The district court incorrectly held FMS § 186.5 unconstitutional
as applied. Marriage statutes may not discriminate based on sex and
may not prefer one sex over another. Thus, FMS § 186.5 does not
discriminate based on sex; it merely preserves "traditional and often
prevailing societal mores." Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1043
(9th Cir. 1982).
Furthermore, the district court applied the incorrect standard of
review. The class of people FMS § 186.5 concerns is homosexuals, to
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whom courts apply not the intermediate scrutiny standard of review, but
rational basis scrutiny. See, e.g., Shahar v. Bowers, 70 F.3d 1218, 1225
(1 1th Cir. 1995). Under the rational basis test, Froessel must show that
its classification of homosexuals is rationally related to its legitimate
state interest. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S.
432,440 (1985). Froessel has shown that its classification is rationally
related to its legitimate interests. Thus, Froessel satisfies the rational
basis test.
A. FMS § 186.5 Does Not Discriminate Based On Sex
1. Definition of the Term "Marriage"
The district court defined "sex" to justify finding sex
discrimination. See Wallace, 912 F. Supp. 2d at 6. However, the district
court should have defined the term "marriage." If "marriage" could be
defined as a relationship between two people of the same gender, then
the next step would be to define sex. After a court defines sex, it may
determine whether sex discrimination exists. The district court in this
case did not recognize that the "operative distinction lies in the
relationship which is described by the term 'marriage' itself and that
relationship is the legal union of one man and one woman." Singer v.
Har, 522 P.2d 1187, 1191 (Wash. 1974). The district court incorrectly
found FMS § 186.5 unconstitutional as applied because it failed to
define "marriage."
No marriage statute may violate the Equal Protection Clause by
discriminating based on sex. Our forbearers wrote this country's laws to
preserve the Judeo-Christian tradition, which considers homosexuality
deviant from traditional norms of society. Marriage is defined as a
"relation between husband and wife," Webster's New World Dictionary
829 (3d ed. 1988), and "unless otherwise defined, words will be
interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning."
Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979). Because marriage is a
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relationship between a man and a woman, a marriage statute may not
give "a mandatory preference to males over females," Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71, 74 (1971), or to females over males.
Furthermore, courts are "only to ascertain and apply the intent
of Congress." Adams, 673 F.2d at 1040. Recently, Congress expressed
that it intends for marriage to remain strictly a relationship only between
a man and a woman. Defense of Marriage Act, 142 Cong. Rec. H7480-
05 (1996), provides the following:
Section 3. Definition of Marriage
(a) In General. Chapter 1 of title 1, United
States Code, is amended by adding at the end
the following:
Section 7. Definition of 'marriage' and 'spouse'
In determining the meaning of any Act of
Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or
interpretation of the various administrative
bureaus and agencies of the United States, the
word 'marriage' means only a legal union
between one man and one woman as husband
and wife, and the word 'spouse' refers only to a
person of the opposite sex who is a husband or
wife.
"Marriage" means a union between only a male and a female. Thus,
FMS § 186.5 does not, and cannot, establish a sex-based classification
that violates the Equal Protection Clause.
2. Equal Protection
Sex discrimination cases challenged under equal protection
FR OESSEL FACT PATTERN
involve discrimination based on gender. Statutes challenged in these
cases pertain to classifications that distinguish between males and
females. Reed, 404 U.S. at 75. Because FMS § 186.5 makes no such
distinction, it does not discriminate based on sex. Except for the Hawaii
Supreme Court in Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 68 (Haw. 1993), no
court has held a marriage statute to discriminate based on sex. We agree
with the district court and the Appellees that FMS § 186.5 prohibits
same-sex marriages. However, "marriage is a social relation subject to
the State's police power." Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967)
(citing Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210 (1888)). Hence, Froessel
may regulate marriage in the manner it desires, so long as its regulation
does not violate the Constitution. States "must, where special protection
for homosexuals [is] concerned, be permitted to do what they please."
Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. Cincinnati, 116 S. Ct. 2519
(1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (denying cert. to 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir.
1995)). FMS § 186.5 does not discriminate based on gender. Therefore,
this Court does not find that the statute discriminates based on sex.
The district court found that the term "sex" could mean "sexual
orientation." Wallace, 912 F. Supp. 2d at 6. We do not reject this
possible definitionof"sex," although to us, "sex" likely means "gender.'!
However, there are good reasons why no court has held that same-sex
marriages are permissible. See. e.g., Dean v. District of Columbia, 653
A.2d 307, 310 (D.D.C. 1995); DeSanto v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952, 954
(Pa. Super. 1984); Singer, 522 P.2d at 1191; Jones v. Hallahan, 501
S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W. 2d
185, 186 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 490 U.S. 810 (1972). Courts
have faithfully recognized that marriage is a "protected legal institution
[between a man and a woman] primarily because of societal values
associated with the propagation of the human race." Singer, 522 P.2d at
1195. Even the court in Baehr, which found that a marriage statute that
prohibits same-sex marriages discriminates based on sex, did not permit
same-sex marriages. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 59. This Court agrees with
other courts that define marriage as a union strictly between a male and
a female.
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Furthermore, even if we adopt "sexual orientation" as a
definition of "sex," we cannot find that FMS § 186.5 discriminates
against Appellees. Dr. Wallace and Ms. McGregor did not allege that
they are a "homosexual couple." Instead, they alleged that they are
merely a "same-sex couple." Wallace, 912 F. Supp. 2d at 3. This Court
wishes to clarify the boundary between "homosexual" and "same-sex"
marriages. Both terms "are not synonymous." Baehr, 852 P.2d at 52
n.1 1. A "homosexual" is a person "characterized by sexual desire for
those of the same sex as oneself." Webster's New World Dictionary 647
(3d ed. 1988). A "heterosexual," on the other hand, is a person
"characterizedby sexual desire for those of the opposite sex." Id. at 634.
That a homosexual is a party to an opposite-sex or same-sex couple has
no bearing on that person's sexual orientation. Thus, "parties to 'a union
between a man and a woman' may or may not be homosexuals. Parties
to a same-sex marriage could theoretically be either homosexuals or
heterosexuals." Baehr, 852 P.2d at 52 n.1 I. Accordingly, even though
"sex" could mean "sexual orientation," Dr. Wallace and Ms. McGregor
were not discriminated against based on their sex; they did not allege
that they are homosexuals.
We reject the district court's finding that an analogy exists
between "equal application" of a statute on races and "equal application"
of a statute on homosexuals. See Wallace, 912 F. Supp. 2d at 8-9; see
Singer, 522 P.2d at 1191. The Sine court rejected the analogy between
the racial classification in Loving and the purported sex classificaticn of
Washington's marriage statute. See id. We agree with the Singer court
that no analogy exists. As the Singer court correctly stated, "[t]he
operative distinction lies in the relationship which is described by
'marriage' itself' and not in a distinction between sexes. See id. If FMS
§ 186.5 were to distinguish between sexes, then this analogy would be
plausible.
The Supreme Court in Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996),
granted homosexuals a wide latitude of rights. See Wallace, 912 F.
Supp. 2d at 7-8. However, neither case mentioned a homosexual's right
to enter into a same-sex marriage. Rather, Romer concerned protecting
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homosexuals from discrimination in exercising their civil rights. 116 S.
Ct. at 1626. These rights include opportunities of employment,
insurance, welfare services, education, and housing. Id. When
homosexuals assert a right to privacy to engage in sexual acts, however,
the Supreme Court has held that no such fundamental right exists. See
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (concluding that
homosexuals do not have a fundamental right to privacy to engage in
sodomy). If one theory behind marriage is to engage legally in sexual
relations, and the Supreme Court has held that such relations are not a
fundamental right for homosexuals, this Court cannot endorse same-sex
marriages. Dr. Wallace and Ms. McGregor were denied a marriage
license, not because of their sex, but "because what they propose is not
a marriage." Jones, 501 S.W.2d at 590. Although the Supreme Court
has accorded homosexuals certain rights, marriage is not one of these
rights. Accordingly, FMS § 186.5 is constitutional.
B. FMS § 186.5 Satisfies The Rational Basis Test
The proper standard of review here is rational basis because "the
operative effect of [FMS § 186.5] is that the statutory classification in
question--the exclusion of same-sex relationships from the definition of
marriage--does not offend the Equal Protection Clause if it rests upon
some rational basis." Singer, 522 P.2d at 1195 (citing Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970); Caughey v. Employment Sec.
Dlt, 503 P.2d 460,463 (Wash. 1972)). The rational basis test requires
that a "statute [be] rationally related to the legitimate state interest."
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. The classification of FMS § 186.5 "can be
explained by reference to [Froessel's] legitimate [state interests] which
justify the incidental disadvantages they impose on certain persons."
Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628. The legitimate interests that the state
advances include (1) preventing the spread of sexually-transmitted
diseases ("STD") and (2) promoting procreation.
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1. Preventing STDs
We agree that Froessel has a valid objective in preventing the
spread of STDs. See Wallace, 912 F. Supp. 2d at 9-10. The next
question is whether FMS § 186.5 is rationally related to this objective.
We answer in the affirmative.
Marriage is an institution between a male and a female.
Marriage promotes monogamy and stability between two people of the
opposite sex. Monogamy and stability would arguably prevent the
spread of STDs and therefore, passes the rational basis scrutiny. It is
unnecessary for us to consider whether same-sex marriages would
prevent the spread of STDs; we have already concluded that same-sex
marriages are impermissible.
2. Promoting Procreation
We also find that FMS § 186.5 promotes procreation. The
district court agreed that procreation is "possible only between a man
and a woman." Wallace, 912 F. Supp. 2d at 10. Although not all
married couples have children (nor are they required to have children),
"marriage exists as a protected legal institution primarily because of
societal values associated with the propagation of the human race."
Singer, 522 P.2d at 1195. Because the "propagation of the human race"
is possible only between a male and a female, we find that FMS § 186.5
is rationally related to Froessel's "procreation" objective.
IV. Discussion: Assisted Suicide
This Court finds that Froessel's statutes prohibiting assisted
suicide do not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. There is no liberty interest in assisted suicide. However,
even if assisted suicide were a liberty interest, the interest does not
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outweigh the state's interest in preserving life, preventing suicide, and
avoiding the influence of third parties.
Although the district court labeled assisted suicide as "hastening
death," the proper term is "assisted suicide." The issue before this Court
is whether a third party may assist others in killing themselves. The
term "hastening death" diminishesthe real weight that the act of assisted
suicide carries.
A. Liberty Interest
There is no liberty interest in assisted suicide. Quill v. Vacco,
80 F.3d 716, 724 (2d Cir. 1996). We reject Appellees'argument that the
interest in assisted suicide is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.
Moreover, the proper analysis for determining a liberty interest is
whether it is deeply rooted in the nation's history and tradition. Moore
v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1976). The right to
assisted suicide is not deeply rooted in this nation's history or tradition.
Quill, 80 F.3d at 724. Actually, the opposite is true. The common law
of England, as received by the American colonies, prohibited not only
suicide but attempted suicide. Quill, 80 F.3d at 723 (citing Thomas J.
Marzen et al., Suicide: A Constitutional Right?, 24 Duq. L. Rev. 1, 56-
67 (1985)). Moreover, at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified, at least twenty-one of the thirty-seven existing states proscribed
assisted suicide whether by state law or as a common law offense.
Michigan v. Kevorkian, 447 Mich. 436, 477, 527 N.W. 2d 714 (1994).
Additionally, assisted suicide is not provided any explicit protection in
the text of the Constitution.
Liberty interests should not be based on society's ever-changing
perceptions. Liberty interests should instead be steadfast and certain,
ones that are reliable and consistent. We heed the warning of the
Supreme Court:
Nor are we inclined to take a more expansive view of
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authority to discover new fundamental rights imbedded
in the Due Process Clause. The Court is most
vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it
deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or
no cognizable roots in the language or design of the
Constitution.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986).
In Bowers, the Supreme Court upheld a state law prohibiting
sodomy and refused to identify a new fundamental right to engage in
sodomy because homosexual sodomy had no constitutional or historical
support. See 478 U.S. at 195. Similarly, there is no basis in the
Constitution for competent persons to receive assistance to commit
suicide. We decline Appellees' suggestion to identify a new liberty
interest.
Additionally, the federal courts have no business in this field:
American law has always accorded the state the power to prevent
suicide, by force if necessary. Cruzan v. Director. Mo. Dep't of Health,
497 U.S. 261, 293 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). The Constitution does
not establish a right to assisted suicide, and therefore, the people of
Froessel, through their elected representatives should be able to make
this decision.
Competent people have a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at
278. Although there may be a liberty interest in refusing unwanted
medical treatment, it is not the next logical step that there is a liberty
interest in assisted suicide. There is a discernable difference between
allowing the natural course of events to take place and actively receiving
help from a third party to commit suicide. Kevorkian, 447 Mich. at 470
(finding that assisted suicide is not a fundamental right and upholding
a state statute imposing criminal penalties on one who assists another in
committing suicide). It is therefore well settled that withdrawing or
refusing life-sustainingmedical treatment is not equivalentto attempting
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suicide. Guardianship of Jane Doe, 411 Mass. 512, 521, 583 N.E. 2d
1263 (1992), cert. denied sub nom. Doe v. Gross, 503 U.S. 950 (1992).
B. Balancing Test
As a result of finding no liberty interest in assisted suicide, our
analysis is complete. It is only after a liberty interest has been identified
that a court must then balance the liberty interest against the asserted
state interests. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982).
However, even if assisted suicide were a liberty interest protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the interest in
assisted suicide does not outweigh Froessel's interests.
1. Preserving Life
Froessel's interest in preserving life in this case is unqualified.
As the Supreme Court found in Cruzan, a state may properly decide not
to make ajudgment about the "quality" of life that a particular individual
enjoys and simply assert an unqualified state interest in the preservation
of human life. 497 U.S. at 282. Froessel has done precisely that with its
statutes prohibiting assisted suicide. Froessel has decided to codify the
importance of life by preventing a third party from assisting in a suicide
and attaching to it the requisite penalties for violating that interest.
Froessel's living will statute does not lessen its interest in
preserving life. The Ninth Circuit is misguided in holding that statutes
permitting living wills demonstrate that the state does not have an
unqualified interest in the preservation of life. Se. Compassion in
Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 817 (1996). There is a discernable
difference between allowing competent people to refuse unwanted
medical treatment to prolong their lives and actively helping people kill
themselves when death would not necessarily occur imminently or
naturally. Therefore, Froessel's statute FHM §80.383, which allows for
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living wills, does not diminish Froessel's interest in preserving life.
With medical technology's proficiency and speed, cures and treatments
are constantly being discovered. Additionally, prognoses and diagnoses
are neither absolute nor definitive.
2. Preventing Suicide
Froessel's interest in preventing people from killing themselves
outweighs a person's interest in receiving assistance in committing
suicide. Suicide is a tragic and distressing societal problem. It is the
second leading cause of death in young people in Froessel. 9
Additionally, many suicides are committed by people who are suffering
from treatable mental disorders.2" Therefore, the state's interest in
preventing suicide should be afforded more weight than the interest of
assisted suicide.
Moreover, doctors should uphold their Hippocratic Oath to
preserve life and should not provide the means and information for
others to end their lives. Additionally, it is difficult and uncertain to
determine the exact duration of a patient's life, even when terminally ill,
due to the imprecision of medical science. Therefore, doctors should
concentrate on making patients' lives comfortable and treat them with
whatever means available.
We summarily reject Appel lees' argument that "hastening death"
may not be suicide. When physicians give their patients the means and
instructions to kill themselves, it is unequivocally suicide.
9 The Limke Study by the Froessel Department of Health and Hospital Services
found that suicide is the second leading cause of death in young people ages 15-34 and one
of the top five causes of death for the 35-54 age group.
2 The Limke Study also found that fifty-one percent of all suicides are not
committed by people who are suffering from a terminal illness but by people who are
suffering from treatable mental illnesses.
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3. Avoiding Influence of Third Parties
Froessel's interest in avoiding the influence of third parties
outweighs the interest of assisted suicide. A state may properly assert
an interest in prohibiting even altruistic assistance to a person who
contemplates suicide. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 820.
The risk that people will commit suicide based on concern for
their loved ones or because they feel guilty about being a burden, as the
district court itself admitted, is a valid concern. Wallace v. Froessel, 912
F. Supp. 2d at 15. Moreover, although measures may be taken to
minimize the danger of undue influence, the concerns that motivation
for, or influence by, third parties cannot be wholly eliminated.
Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 826. Therefore, greater weight should
be given to this influence by third parties in a balancing. Id. We hold
that even if assisted suicide is a liberty interest, it does not outweigh the
State's interest in preventing the influence of third parties.
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the district court and
deny Appellees' declaratory and injunctive relief on both causes of
action.
/s/
Edinburgh, K., C.J.
Dated: August 1, 1996
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES
Docket No. 1269/96
September Term
-------------------- x
WILLAMINA WALLACE and
MURRON MCGREGOR,
Petitioners,
v. ORDER GRANTING
CERTIORARI
THE STATE OF FROESSEL,
Respondent.
------------------------------------------------------ x
The petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Thirteenth Circuit to review the decision in Froessel v.
Wallace, 49 F.3d 53 (13th Cir. 1996), is granted as to the following
issues:
1. What is the appropriate standard of review under equal
protection, where Respondent constructed a statute which
restricts marriages to opposite-sex couples, and under that
standard, did Respondent violate the Petitioners'equal protection
rights?
2. Is there a liberty interest in assisted suicide, and if so, does it
outweigh the Respondent's asserted interests under the
appropriate balancing test and therefore, violate the Petitioners'
due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment?
